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1 
MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES: A EU PERSPECTIVE ON 
UPHOLDING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH TAXATION AND 
PUBLIC FINANCE 
CRISTINA TRENTA* 
INTRODUCTION 
The European Union (“EU”) proclaimed the year 2015 as the year for 
development.1 The EU is working hard to enhance development within Europe 
and within developing countries.2 Development is currently one of the focus 
areas at the European and at the international level.3 In the EU Joint Declaration 
on Consensus on Development, the EU Parliament lists a series of areas of law 
that affect development.4 Immigration law is an important topic to tackle within 
development,5 together with the provision of sustainable solutions for refugees.6 
The EU strives to make “migration a positive factor for development.”7 The EU 
 
* Cristina Trenta, Dr., Dr., Docent, Associate Professor, Tax law, Örebro University (Sweden). The 
author is thankful to Prof. Dr. Bertil Wiman and the Uppsala Center for Tax Law, supported by 
Deloitte, EY, KPMG, Mannheimer Swartling, PwC, Skeppsbron Skatt, Svalner, for their financial 
assistance in the final stages of research. 
 1. Council Decision 472/2014, art. 1, 2014 O.J. (L 136) 1, 4 (EU) (designating 2015 as the 
“European Year for Development” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 2. Development and Cooperation, EUR. UNION, https://europa.eu/european-union/topics/de 
velopment-cooperation_en [https://perma.cc/G7HX-QJRP]. 
 3. See Development Centre, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], http://www.o 
ecd.org/dev/ [https://perma.cc/LNC6-XGME]. 
 4.  See generally Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments 
of the Member States Meeting Within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission 
on European Union Development Policy: ‘The European Consensus,’ 2006 O.J. (C 46) 1 (EU) 
[hereinafter European Consensus on Development]. 
 5. Id. at 7 (“Development is also the most effective long-term response to forced and illegal 
migration and trafficking of human beings.”). For a more recent statement, see Joint Statement by 
the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States Meeting Within the 
Council, the European Parliament and the Commission: The New European Consensus on 
Development: ‘Our World, Our Dignity, Our Future,’ 2017 O.J. (C 210) 1, 4 (EU) [hereinafter 
European Consensus on Development] (acknowledging that “mobility and migration” is an element 
that needs to be addressed in order to achieve sustainable development). 
 6. European Consensus on Development, supra note 4, at 4. 
 7. Id. at 7. 
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Commission supported this view in their recent document “A Global 
Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development.”8 
The need to integrate migration policies into development policies has also 
been suggested by the EU Commission in another document discussing the 
development-migration nexus and maintaining that refugees and other migrants 
can result in positive assets for the national economies.9 
The interconnections between migrants, refugees,10 and development is an 
area of intervention and research which is very well explored in doctrine: the 
same cannot be said unfortunately of the links these factors have to tax law and 
public finance,11 even though systematic investigations of this interplay is 
attracting considerable European and international attention in the specific field 
of tax law. 
This Paper aims to provide an initial survey of the problems that connect 
taxation and public finance to current migration and refugee policies. It then 
discusses the existing EU obligations in the light of both European and 
international regulations and constraints in the area and concludes by illustrating 
the role taxation could play in supporting solutions to the refugee and migrant 
crisis that are respectful of the principles adopted by the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights,12 with the goal of providing benchmarks for further 
analysis and an initial platform for possible improvements in the light of future 
reforms.  
 
 8. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Global 
Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development after 2015, at 14, COM (2015) 
44 final (Feb. 5, 2015). 
 9. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Maximising the 
Development Impact of Migration, at 3, COM (2013) 292 final (May 21, 2013) (explaining how 
refugees can benefit economies through human capital, labor skills, and creating demand for goods 
and services). 
 10. Refugees are persons escaping from armed conflict or persecution. See United Nations 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1(A)(2), July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 152 
(entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. The protection of refugees 
includes the guarantee of different human rights. Conversely, migrants decide to move not because 
of a direct threat of persecution or death. See UNHCR Viewpoint: ‘Refugee’ or ‘Migrant’ – Which 
Is Right?, U.N. REFUGEES AGENCY (July 11, 2016), http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/7/55df 
0e556/unhcr-viewpoint-refugee-migrant-right.html [https://perma.cc/UCA6-B9K2?type=image]. 
 11. For the link between tax law and development, see generally Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social 
Committee: Tax and Development, Cooperating with Developing Countries on Promoting Good 
Governance in Tax Matters, COM (2010) 163 final (Apr. 21, 2010). 
 12. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 391, 395 (EU) 
[hereinafter EU Charter] (noting that the EU is “based on the principles of democracy and the rule 
of law”). 
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I.  THE EU COMMITMENT TO UPHOLDING HUMAN RIGHTS 
Concerns for social justice are nowadays strongly intertwined with concerns 
about immigration flows. The migrant and refugee phenomenon currently 
experienced in Europe is alarming because of the unpreparedness of both the EU 
and the individual EU Member States in dealing with the massive social and 
governance issues that the unrelenting inflow of people presents.13 
In 2015, one million individuals entered the EU creating an unprecedented 
humanitarian crisis with enormous political repercussions.14 The EU 
Commission recognized that, albeit reactions were timely, they fell collectively 
short of managing the situation, leading to the recent set up of the Agenda on 
Migration of the EU.15 It has been estimated that currently more than sixty 
million people have been coercively pushed out of their countries because of 
conflicts or natural disasters.16  
The EU certainly is committed to upholding human rights. The Lisbon 
Treaty17 considers human rights and the people’s well-being a core value for the 
EU, as proclaimed in Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union (“TEU”).18 
The respect of human rights not only governs EU internal activities, but also all 
EU external actions.19 Specifically, EU external policies concerned with 
development cooperation20 have to be respectful of human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, and the rule of law.21 The European Court of Justice 
(“ECJ”) upheld this correspondence between human rights and development in 
European Parliament v. Commission of the European Communities.22 
 
 13. Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, EUR. COMM’N (June 19, 2017), http://ec.euro 
pa.eu/echo/refugee-crisis_en [https://perma.cc/MRW8-9FVJ]. 
 14. Migrant Crisis: One Million Enter Europe in 2015, BBC NEWS (Dec. 22, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35158769 [https://perma.cc/7EK5-7HHW]. 
 15. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A European Agenda 
on Migration, at 2, COM (2015) 240 final (May 13, 2005). 
 16. EUR. CIVIL PROT. & HUMANITARIAN AID OPERATIONS, EUR. COMM’N, FORCED 
DISPLACEMENT: REFUGEES, ASYLUM-SEEKERS AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE (IDPs) 2 
(2017), http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/thematic/refugees_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/23VQ-KSKM]. 
 17. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing 
the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 (EU) [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon]. 
 18. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 2, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 
326) 13, 17 (EU) [hereinafter TEU]. 
 19. Id. art. 21, at 28–29. 
 20. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 208(1), 
Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47, 141 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
 21. Sergio Carrera, Daniel Gros & Elspeth Guild, What Priorities for the New European 
Agenda on Migration?, CEPS COMMENT., Apr. 22, 2015, at 1, https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/ 
MigrationPriorities.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4C2-XCV3]. 
 22. Case C-403/05, Parliament v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. I-9070, ¶ 57. 
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Additionally, Articles 18 and 19 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
assure the rights of asylum and also protect people subjected to removal, 
expulsion or extradition in the event that a serious risk exists that these people 
would face a death penalty, torture, or any other inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment.23 The EU Member states are also signing parties in the Refugee 
Convention, thus accepting to provide international protection to people 
escaping from persecution or serious harm.24 The Convention also grants 
refugees, among other rights, the rights to work, education, housing, and access 
to the judicial system.25 
EU Member States can violate human rights under the protection of the EU 
Charter in times of humanitarian crisis if those rights are in fact ineffective.26 
Breach may occur if the discussed area of law falls under the scope of application 
of the EU Charter, and if a Member State’s inaction violates the rights of asylum 
seekers.27 Infringements of the EU Charter’s provisions may occur when EU 
Member States implement or fail to implement EU law.28 It is worth stressing 
that after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU Charter has become 
a binding instrument.29 
II.  THE FINANCIAL BURDEN OF THE IMMIGRATION INFLOW 
Amidst this humanitarian crisis, the EU and its Member States are finding 
out they cannot protect human rights if there are not sufficient public finance 
and taxation funds specifically devoted to sustaining this effort, nor if there are 
no adequate institutional structures prepared to cope and manage such states of 
emergency. This way, the letter of the law becomes a stranglehold: costs 
associated with the refugee inflow and the related duties states have to fulfill are 
 
 23. EU Charter arts. 18, 19, supra note 12, at 399. 
 24. Acceptance of Selected UN Conventions, EUR. UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RTS., 
http://fra.europa.eu/en/publications-and-resources/data-and-maps/int-obligations/un [https://per 
ma.cc/JNN3-M34S]. 
 25. Refugee Convention arts. 16–17, 21–22, supra note 10, at 164, 166, 168 (recognizing 
“access to courts,” “wage-earning employment,” “housing,” and “public education” as rights). 
 26. See VICTORIA METCALFE-HOUGH, OVERSEAS DEV. INST., THE MIGRATION CRISIS? 
FACTS, CHALLENGES AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 4 (2015), https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/ 
files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9913.pdf [https://perma.cc/V9RY-7NJR] (explaining 
the challenges facing Member States due to the scale of the crisis and the financial costs associated 
with housing, education, health, and other welfare sources). 
 27. See Simas Grigonis, EU in the Face of Migrant Crisis: Reasons for Ineffective Human 
Rights Protection, 2 INT’L COMP. JURIS. 93, 96 (2016) (“[D]uring the migrant crisis most of the 
actions that allegedly infringed the rights of asylum seekers were performed by the Member States. 
It was the Member States that . . . prevented [asylum seekers] from entering their respective 
territories [and] did not provide sufficient information or ensure due process for their rights 
defense.”). 
 28. EU Charter art. 51, supra note 12, at 406. 
 29. Grigonis, supra note 27, at 96. 
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obligations,30 not options31 or acts of charity,32 but the political and social costs 
connected to substantial public resources being redirected and spent are proving 
too onerous.33 
All the same, EU principles, intents, and statutes are conflicting with the 
costs that Europe and EU Member States sustain to manage the unfolding crisis. 
Protecting and upholding human rights34 is proving a difficult proposition 
requiring vast public finance expenditures and constant deployment of more 
resources,35 both nationally and at the community level: 
[A] refugee can . . . be properly processed, housed, and fed, and given medical 
care at the cost of 35 percent of the host country’s per capita GDP. . . . For EU 
member states, this would give us an average fiscal cost per refugee and year of 
roughly €10,000. For 3.5 million refugees, this would come to €35 billion per 
year. . . . In fiscal terms, accepting 3.5 million refugees into the EU should not 
be a problem, if it is properly managed. Still, given the limits on the EU’s budget 
and the political difficulties of reform – raising €70 billion from the existing 
budget would probably require an overhaul of the Common Agricultural Policy 
. . . it would be unrealistic to hope to mobilise resources of this magnitude 
merely by shifting funds around. It may also be unrealistic to get this amount in 
additional transfers from national budgets to the EU, given that budgets are 
already strained.36  
 
 30. See Giovanni Sartor, Fundamental Legal Concepts: A Formal and Teleological 
Characterization, 14 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 101, 120 (2006) (“If one wants to achieve 
the conditioned legal result . . . one must bear the cost . . . of realizing the additional condition.”). 
 31. SERENA BRUGNOLA, INST. OF EUR. DEMOCRATS, ARE REFUGEES THE REAL THREAT TO 
EUROPEAN IDENTITY? 20 (2016), https://www.iedonline.eu/download/2016/schengen/BRUGNO 
LA.pdf?m=1466518861 [https://perma.cc/59FV-LSA8]. 
 32. URBAN JONSSON, HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMING 20–21 
(2003) (“Decisions and actions must be taken in recognition that every human being is a subject of 
human rights, not an object of charity or benevolence.”); see also CEMAL KARAKAS, ECONOMIC 
CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS OF THE REFUGEE INFLUX 2 (Eur. Parliament Research Serv., 
Briefing No. PE 572.809, Dec. 2015), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/ 
572809/EPRS_BRI(2015)572809_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6V8-T5E2] (“In the long term . . . 
the refugee influx might be positive for the European economy.”). 
 33. SEBASTIAN DULLIEN, EUR. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, PAYING THE PRICE: THE 
COST OF EUROPE’S REFUGEE CRISIS 2 (2016), http://www.ecfr.eu/page//ECFR_168_PAYING_ 
THE_PRICE_-_THE_COST_OF_EUROPES_REFUGEE_CRISIS.pdf [https://perma.cc/HUL6-
W6QJ] (mentioning the differences in the economic sustainability of refugee inflows across the EU 
Member States). 
 34. See WOLFGANG OBENLAND, TAXES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (Tax Justice Network Ger., 
Policy Brief No. 08e, Feb. 2013), http://www.rightingfinance.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/02/ 
Read-full-document.pdf [https://perma.cc/3495-BMTF] (recognizing that “protecting and ensuring 
human rights” is among the “most important obligations of governments”). 
 35. See STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY 
DEPENDS ON TAXES 97 (1999) (“Rights will regularly be curtailed when available resources dry up 
. . . .”). 
 36. DULLIEN, supra note 33, at 10–11. 
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Rejection of refugees may be an alternative for EU Member States, but it 
too may impose a financial burden and related monetary costs as well. The EU 
Commission has presented a first set of legislative proposals to reform the 
Common European Asylum System and create “a fairer, more efficient, and 
more sustainable system for allocating asylum applications among [EU] 
Member States.”37 According to the proposal, a EU Member State may have the 
option to reject a refugee.38 In that case, the EU Member State would need to 
pay a financial solidarity contribution of €250,000 for each applicant for whom 
it would otherwise have been responsible under the fairness mechanism of 
distribution of refugees.39 Very clearly, both alternatives carry an economic 
burden; consequently, public finance or taxation measures need to be 
investigated to assure resources are available that can cover the costs of refugees 
and the guaranteeing of their human rights.40 
III.  THE ROLE OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC FINANCE 
The recent EU Commission’s preparatory works stress the link between 
taxation and migration.41 In the 2016 preparatory work “Forced Displacement 
and Development,” the EU Commission emphasizes the double role tax law and 
public finance play in such scenarios.42 Public spending allows the creation of 
public services for displaced persons, but it can also be used as a tool to ease the 
process.43 
In a more recent document, “Proposal for a New European Consensus on 
Development,” the EU Commission has reaffirmed its continuous commitment 
in respect to migration, while at the same time paying particular attention to tax 
 
 37. European Commission Press Release IP/16/1620, Towards a Sustainable and Fair 
Common European Asylum System (May 4, 2016). 
 38. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing 
the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an 
Application for International Protection Lodged in One of the Member States by a Third-Country 
National or a Stateless Person (Recast), at 10, COM (2016) 270 final (May 5, 2016). 
 39. Id. at 19. 
 40. See JACOB FUNK KIRKEGAARD, TOWARD A EUROPEAN MIGRATION AND MOBILITY 
UNION 1–2, 6–8 (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., Policy Brief No. PB15-23, Dec. 2015), 
https://piie.com/publications/pb/pb15-23.pdf [https://perma.cc/UWF6-ZEAH] (investigating new 
funding sources). 
 41. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Lives in Dignity: 
from Aid-Dependence to Self-Reliance, Forced Displacement and Development, at 15, COM 
(2016) 234 final (Apr. 26, 2016) (“[T]he financial burden on the host country from hosting refugees 
could also be achieved through tax revenues.”). 
 42. Id. at 15–17. 
 43. Id. at 15 (“Public spending creates public services for displaced persons, and it can be used 
as a tool to ease the integration process.”). 
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law and its role in fostering development.44 In this light, taxation seems to be 
able to play a substantial role and help increase the visibility of the EU efforts 
in this area and increase awareness within EU Member States, following in the 
footsteps of other fundamental rights which are individually named and funded 
through taxation, such as healthcare or education. 
In the EU framework, taxes are public revenue and contributions for general 
community, social, and economic policies.45 Non-fiscal or extra-fiscal interests 
come in when we approach taxes from the point of view of their goals and in 
terms of economic or social policing.46 Taxes work toward cooperation and 
solidarity: they are not the only tools that the public operators have at their 
disposal, of course, but they are rather effective when pursuing redistributive, 
allocative, and social policies that foster growth and development. From this 
perspective, taxes are perceived and evaluated more in ethical terms as 
promoting social welfare and as distributive justice.47 This is a view shared by 
the Lima Declaration on Tax Justice and Human Rights:48 this nonbinding 
document maintains that tax revenue is the most crucial tool to provide resources 
to support, protect, and uphold human rights in “sufficient, equitable, and 
accountable ways.”49  
International obligations for contracting states also exist in respect to 
collecting financial resources to make the upholding of human rights more 
effective. This is what the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”)50 prescribes in Article 2(1), concerning the duty for 
contracting states to collect revenue in order to secure and make effective human 
rights as contained in the international instrument.51 The link among tax and 
 
 44. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Region: Proposal for a New 
European Consensus on Development, Our World, Our Dignity, Our Future, at 25, COM (2016) 
740 final (Nov. 22, 2016) (stressing that particular attention should be given to combating tax 
avoidance). 
 45. CÉCILE REMEUR, TAX POLICY IN THE EU: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 1 (Eur. 
Parliamentary Research Serv., In-Depth Analysis No. PE 549.001, Feb. 2015). 
 46. See José Marcos Domingues, Biofuels, Megacities, and Green Taxes: The Whys and 
Wherefores of Non-Fiscal Fuel Taxation. Brazil in World Context, in 7 CRITICAL ISSUES IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 283, 288 (Kurt 
Deketelaere et al. eds., 2009); Joachim Englisch & Henning Tappe, The Federal Republic of 
Germany, in TAX ASPECTS OF FISCAL FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 273, 320 
(Gianluigi Bizioli & Claudio Sacchetto eds., 2011) (“[T]ax laws may also pursue extra-fiscal policy 
objectives.”). 
 47. RICHARD W. TRESCH, PUBLIC FINANCE: A NORMATIVE THEORY 173 (3d ed. 2015). 
 48. LIMA DECLARATION ON TAX JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHT ¶ 1 (2015). 
 49. Id. ¶ 2. 
 50. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
 51. Id. at art. 2(1) (“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and 
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fiscal policy, revenue raising and expenditures of Article 2(1) of the ICESCR, 
and human rights has been recently acknowledged by the United Nations. U.N. 
Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Magdalena 
Sepúlveda Carmona, submitted her report concerning the impact of fiscal and 
tax policy on human rights at the 26th Session of the U.N. Human Rights 
Council in June 2014.52 The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights maintain that while guaranteeing these rights is a 
matter of international law, national states are de facto carrying responsibility 
for their effective upholding.53 Violations of human rights generated by sub-
standard public financing shift the responsibility of any deriving social and fiscal 
injustice to the individual state.54 
IV.  INVESTIGATING OPTIONS 
A. Taxation of Refugees and Limits from International and EU Law 
Proposals based on shifting the burden of taxation onto refugees have been 
suggested to render states less attractive to migrants and refugees.55 These 
consider refugees liable to taxation simply on the basis of entering the country, 
with an income tax applied in the territory of the hosting state. The application 
of such a tax would result in an income tax roughly comparable to what they 
would pay in the country they fled. The reasoning is that the tax would consent 
to introduce a barrier that would help differentiate between refugees and those 
who falsely claim that status. 
Tax law doctrine supports this approach. Domestic and customary 
international law do not prevent a country from applying a worse tax treatment 
to foreigners, and therefore refugees, subjecting them to protectionist taxation 
measures in the host country.56 Such a solution would not formally conflict with 
 
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the 
full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including 
particularly the adoption of legislative measures.”). 
 52. Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona (Special Rapporteur), Report on Extreme Poverty and 
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/28 (May 22, 2014). 
 53. Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ¶ 6, U.N. 
Doc. E/C.12/2000/13, reprinted in 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 691, 693 (1998) (noting that states have the 
obligation to protect economic, cultural, and social rights). 
 54. See Ignacio Saiz, Resourcing Rights: Combating Tax Injustice from a Human Rights 
Perspective, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND PUBLIC FINANCE: BUDGETS AND THE PROMOTION OF 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 77, 92 (Aoife Nolan et al. eds., 2013). 
 55. Ryan Bubb, Michael Kremer & David I. Levin, The Economics of International Refugee 
Law, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 367, 383 (2011). 
 56. JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 529 
n.1193 (2005) (citing BRIAN J. ARNOLD, TAX DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ALIENS, NON-
RESIDENTS, AND FOREIGN ACTIVITIES: CANADA, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, THE UNITED 
KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES 23 (1991)). 
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the letter of international law on the point. Article 2(1) of the ICESCR prescribes 
each state to take positive action in collecting as much of its available resources 
as it can, the end goal being to fully realize economic, social, and cultural 
rights.57 On the other hand, this would go directly against another international 
obligation, since the Refugee Convention, Article 29, positively maintains that: 
“Contracting States shall not impose upon refugees duties, charges or taxes, of 
any description whatsoever, other or higher than those which are or may be 
levied on their nationals in similar situations.”58 
The references to “duties, charges or taxes” in the Refugee Convention are 
included in a provision bearing the heading of “Fiscal charges” and therefore 
purportedly including tax measures and “every kind of public assessment, be it 
of a general nature (taxes and duties) or for specific services rendered by the 
authorities to a given person (charges).”59 
The United Nations observed that the provision included in Article 29 of the 
Refugee Convention was necessary, since refugees, formally stateless, are not 
protected by bilateral tax treaties: 
In principle foreigners residing in a country are subject to the taxes, 
duties and charges to which nationals are liable. They may also be 
subject to special taxes, duties and charges. A large number of bilateral 
treaties concluded on the basis of reciprocity stipulate that nationals of 
the contracting country shall enjoy the same treatment in fiscal matters 
as nationals. Stateless persons cannot invoke these treaties.60 
Article 29 also prevents worse treatment to refugees in respect to citizens, 
specifically mentioning “other” (meaning different) or “higher” taxes or 
charges.61 A refugee’s fiscal position is a very unsafe one, with an increased tax 
liability and paradoxically higher risks of double taxation. Even when tax 
treaties can be invoked, the possibility they do not include clauses of protection 
 
 57. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 50, at art. 
2(1). 
 58. Refugee Convention art. 29, supra note 10, at 172. 
 59. HATHAWAY, supra note 56, at 530 (quoting NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, CONVENTION 
RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES: ITS HISTORY, CONTENTS AND INTERPRETATION: A 
COMMENTARY 148 (1953)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 60. U.N. Ad Hoc Comm. on Refugees & Stateless Persons, A Study of Statelessness, U.N. 
Doc. E/1112;E/1112/Add.1, at 24 (Aug. 1, 1949). 
 61. HATHAWAY, supra note 56, at 531. 
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against discrimination based on nationality62 or citizenship63 are very real, or 
that reciprocity is rejected on the basis of political reasons.64 
Doctrine maintains that the fiscal equality deriving from this provision is a 
formal guarantee that does not exclude the possibility for refugees to pay higher 
taxes than the citizens of the host country.65 For example, their source of income 
could be subject to a different and more penalizing tax treatment than the 
average source of income for citizens.66 
The obligations descending from the Refugee Convention are binding for 
contracting states such as the EU Member States,67 and are placed, according to 
Article 35, under the supervision of the United Nations.68 National authorities 
are required to cooperate and facilitate U.N. supervision in respect to the 
application of the Refugee Convention.69 Then, the introduction of a tax bearing 
on refugees would also be in conflict with EU law. The ECJ, in the Dimensione 
Direct Sales case, explicitly states that EU law must be interpreted consistently 
with international law, especially where a connection exists between the two.70 
The doctrine of consistent or uniform interpretation71 is also in line with the 
TEU, whose Article 3(5) states that the EU promotes the strict observance of 
 
 62. See OECD, Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital art. 24(1), 
Jan. 28, 2003, http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/1914467.pdf [https://perma.cc/5426-NVYN] 
(forbidding discrimination by one Contracting State against nationals of another contracting state). 
 63. Id. at art. 3(1)(g)(i) (defining “national,” in relation to a Contracting State, as “any 
individual possessing the nationality or citizenship of that Contracting State.”). The principal rule 
for the non-discrimination clause in the OECD Model Tax Convention is nationality, while the 
criterion of residence is not the ground for the applicability of Article 24). See Ines Hofbauer, Tax 
Treaty Interpretation in Austria, in ECOTAX, TAX TREATY INTERPRETATION 13, 20 (Michael 
Lang ed., 2001). 
 64. HATHAWAY, supra note 56, at 527–31. 
 65. Id. at 531. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 339 
(“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good 
faith.”). 
 68. Refugee Convention art. 35, supra note 10, at 176 (“The Contracting States undertake to 
co-operate with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or any other 
agency of the United Nations which may succeed it, in the exercise of its functions, and shall in 
particular facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the provisions of this Convention.”). 
 69. See generally Monica Erasmus-Koen & Sjoerd Douma, Legal Status of the OECD 
Commentaries – In Search of the Holy Grail of International Tax Law, 61 BULL. FOR INT’L TAX’N 
339, 350 n.21 (2007). 
 70. Case C-516/13, Dimensione Direct Sales Srl, Michele Labianca v. Knoll International 
SpA, ¶ 23 (May 13, 2015), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=164262&do 
clang=EN [https://perma.cc/T3U6-8ZBW]. 
 71. Jan Wouters, Jed Odermatt & Thomas Ramopoulos, Worlds Apart? Comparing the 
Approaches of the European Court of Justice and the EU Legislature to International Law, in THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2017] MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES 11 
international law.72 Nevertheless, national attempts from both non-EU and EU 
Member states to introduce some form of differentiated tax burden for migrants 
and refugees are not so farfetched. In 1995, the federal government of Canada 
introduced a 975 Canadian dollar fee to every adult refugee and immigrant for 
the right of landing.73 In 2000, refugees were exempted, and as of 2006, 
immigrants pay a reduced fee.74 The tax has been widely criticized in that its 
flat-rate nature does not respect the principle of ability-to-pay for newcomers, 
hurts immigrants from poorer countries more, and is not tied to any provision of 
services.75 Additional perplexities are associated with it being in possible breach 
of the Refugee Convention, whose Article 34 regulates naturalization and 
prescribes contracting states to facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of 
refugees, specifically indicating how charges and costs may be an obstacle to 
the process: “They shall in particular make every effort to expedite 
naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and costs 
of such proceedings.”76 
Europe is not exempt from similar experiences. Under the Single Permit 
Directive,77 EU law allows Member States to charge fees for issuing permits.78 
The fee has to be “proportionate and may be based on the services actually 
provided for the processing of applications and the issuance of permits.”79 
 
249, 249 (Marise Cremona & Anne Thies eds., 2013) (stating that the ECJ “has interpreted EU law 
in light of international law”). 
 72. TEU art. 3(5), supra note 18, at 17. 
  In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values 
and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, 
security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among 
peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in 
particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of 
international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter. 
Id. 
 73. Fees: Right of Permanent Residence Fee (RPRF) - R303, Background, GOV’T CAN. (Feb. 
24, 2017), http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/tools/fees/imm/rprf.asp [https://perma.cc/WQ 
4V-K6A5]. 
 74. ANDREW BROUWER, CALEDON INST. OF SOC. POL’Y, PROTECTION WITH A PRICE TAG: 
THE HEAD TAX FOR REFUGEES AND THEIR FAMILIES MUST GO 2–3 (June 1999), http://www.cale 
doninst.org/Publications/PDF/headtax.pdf [https://perma.cc/VBR6-LARC]; GOV’T CAN., supra 
note 73. 
 75. THE HEAD TAX AND ITS EARLY HISTORY, THE GETTING LANDED PROJECT, 
https://www.cpj.ca/files/docs/headtax_kit_no_cover1.pdf [https://perma.cc/653K-E9FF]. 
 76. Refugee Convention art. 34, supra note 10, at 176. 
 77. The Single Permit Directive regulates residence and work permits for non-EU citizens. 
Directive 2011/98, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2001 on a Single 
Application Procedure for a Single Permit for Third-Country Nationals to Reside and Work in the 
Territory of a Member State and on a Common Set of Rights for Third-Country Workers Legally 
Residing in a Member State, 2011 O.J. (L 343) 1, 1 (EU). 
 78. Id. art. 10, at 7. 
 79. Id. 
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However, the Directive does not specify any ceiling. In the case of long-term 
residence permits, the ECJ maintained they should be “reasonable and fair and 
they must not discourage third-country nationals who satisfy the conditions laid 
down by that directive from exercising the right of residence conferred on them 
by that directive.”80 
This has not stopped Italy from stipulating that the issuing and renewing of 
residence permits for third-country nationals who are long-term residents should 
be subject to an obligatory tax and financial contribution, which is eight times 
the one for obtaining a national identity card.81 Italian law prescribes the 
payment of a fee, the amount of which shall be set at a minimum of €80 and a 
maximum of €200 by joint decree of the Ministry of the Economy and Finance 
and of the Ministry of the Interior.82 Exemption of payment in case of issuance 
and renewal of residence permits for asylum, request for asylum, subsidiary 
protection, and humanitarian reasons has only been introduced in 2009.83 The 
ECJ found Italian legislation in breach of the principles of the Single Permit 
Directive,84 mandating a disproportionate fee in the light of the objective 
pursued by said Directive and liable to create an obstacle to the exercise of the 
rights conferred therein.85 
B. A EU Approach Based on the Principle of Solidarity 
The EU is a “community of solidarity,” and its budget has a distinct 
solidarity aim.86 Following the Lisbon Treaty, the EU introduced Article 80 of 
the TFEU, establishing “the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of 
responsibility, including its financial implications” in the chapter devoted to 
policies on border checks, asylum, and immigration.87 Before Article 80, Article 
 
 80. Case C-508/10, Comm’n v. Kingdom of the Netherlands, ¶ 46 (April 26, 2012), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62010CJ0508&from=EN [https://perma. 
cc/ZR3D-Y5CB]; see also OECD, RECRUITING IMMIGRANT WORKERS: EUROPE 2016, at 170 
(2016). 
 81. Case C-309/14, Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL), Istituto Nazionale 
Confederale Assistenza (INCA) v. Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Ministero dell’Interno, 
Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, ¶¶ 14, 19 (Sept. 2, 2015), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62014CJ0309&from=EN [https://perma.cc/C8HH-SHR8]. 
 82. Decreto Legislativo 25 luglio 1998, n.286, L. Mar. 6, 1998, n.40, art. 5(2b) (It.). 
 83. Legge 15 luglio 2009, n.94, G.U. July 24, 2009, n.170, supplement ordinario n.128, art. 
1(22)(b) (It.) (amending L. Mar. 6, 1998, n.40, art. 5(2b)). 
 84. Case C-309/14, ¶ 30. 
 85. Id. ¶ 31. 
 86. Financing the European Union: Commission Report on the Operation of the Own 
Resources System, at 17, COM (2004) 505 final, Volume II (June 9, 2004). 
 87. TFEU art. 80, supra note 20, at 78; see also Paul McDonough & Evangelia (Lilian) 
Tsourdi, The “Other” Greek Crisis: Asylum and EU Solidarity, 31 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 67, 74 
(2012); BRUGNOLA, supra note 31, at 15. The solidarity principle has led to the approval of several 
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63 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community only “promot(ed) a 
balance of effort between Member States in receiving and bearing the 
consequences of receiving refugees and displaced persons.”88 
In the context of the TFEU, solidarity as introduced by Article 80 means 
solidarity between the EU and the Member States, with the specific aim to reach 
the goals set out in the EU treaties.89 Solidarity is also enacted through the 
redistribution of public financial resources via taxation.90  
And while the EU Commission is reviewing use and results of financial 
instruments in the area of immigration,91 lack of coordination means that 
emergency efforts are carried out by individual states that also adopt national 
approaches to solving the matter of migrants and refugees. A good example is 
the Mare Nostrum Operation, which was launched by the Italian Government in 
2013,92 solely financed via the Italian national public budget, and carried an 
overall cost of nine million euros per month, or approximately 100 million euros 
per annum.93  
This annual figure is negligible in respect to the EU budget and the Italian 
GDP, sizing up to approximately 1/1,500th of the former and 1/15,000th of the 
latter, respectively.94 Nonetheless, the political debate around the operation was 
fierce and mostly focused on how the financial burden was not shared between 
EU Member States.95 
 
common funds. DAMIAN CHALMERS, GARETH DAVIES & GIORGIO MONTI, EUROPEAN UNION 
LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS 539 (3d ed. 2014). 
 88. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 63(2)(b), 
Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33, 59 (EC). 
 89. See TFEU art. 80, supra note 20, at 78. 
  The policies of the Union set out in this Chapter and their implementation shall be 
governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its 
financial implications, between the Member States. Whenever necessary, the Union acts 
adopted pursuant to this Chapter shall contain appropriate measures to give effect to this 
principle. 
Id. 
 90. DIRK VANHEULE ET AL., THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 80 TFEU, at 28 (Eur. 
Parliament, Study No. PE 453.167, 2011). 
 91. See id. at 88. 
 92. Mare Nostrum Operation, MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA (It.), http://www.marina.difesa.it/E 
N/operations/Pagine/MareNostrum.aspx [https://perma.cc/H79M-C5NJ]. 
 93. The New European Operation Frontex Plus/Triton: An Operation with Differing 
Objectives and More Limited Means than the Mare Nostrum Operation, EUR. ASS’N FOR DEF. 
HUM. RTS., www.aedh.eu/The-new-European-operation-Frontex.html [https://perma.cc/9E9E8 
TSJ]. 
 94. EU by Topic: Budget, EUR. UNION, http://europa.eu/european-union/topics/budget_en 
[https://perma.cc/R6SK-5SC7] (showing that the EU budget is 145 billion euros); Italy GDP, 
TRADING ECON., http://tradingeconomics.com/italy/gdp [https://perma.cc/R99K-7F5G] (showing 
that the Italian GDP was approximately 1.5 trillion euros in 2016). 
 95. See Carrera et al., supra note 21, at 1–2. 
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V.  DISCORD BETWEEN THE EU AND THE EU MEMBER STATES 
The ongoing inflow of refugees in Europe is of course a primary political 
concern of the Union, but widespread consensus on how to manage the related 
financial burden created by the phenomenon is still to come.96 Different 
proposals considering public finance measures or taxation have been pushed 
forward recently by both the EU and by individual Member States which support 
the idea that the current national and European budget need to be reinforced 
through the introduction of new taxes.97 In January 2016, the European 
Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs, Taxation and Customs 
stated that while there is agreement that the refugee crisis requires an increase 
in financial resources, the same cannot be said of how such additional resources 
should be collected.98 
Solutions which have been proposed include an increase of the budget 
currently allocated to refugees and migrants’ aid and management from 1% to 
10% of the EU’s budget;99 the introduction of a Schengen Fund based on 
national contributions pro rata GDP,100 especially targeting short-term costs and 
one-off investments due to the migration inflow;101 a cost-sharing fund that 
would be financed by national contributions;102 and a new tax on travel into the 
EU and on visa applications for tourism or labor purposes, primarily targeting 
non-EU citizens.103 
 
 96. See Joakim Ruist, Fiscal Cost of Refugees in Europe, VOX: CEPR’S POLICY PORTAL 
(Jan. 28, 2016), voxeu.org/article/fiscal-cost-refugees-europe [https://perma.cc/V283-VNXS]. 
Policymakers are in disagreement over how to react to the inflow of refugees because of “the 
perceived financial burden that would result from larger intakes.” Id. 
 97. See, e.g., Eszter Zalan, Germany Proposes EU Petrol Tax to Pay for Refugees, EU 
OBSERVER (Jan. 18, 2016), http://euobserver.com/migration/131876 [https://perma.cc/4C8UDY 
6L]. 
 98. See Cécile Barbière, EU Considers Petrol Tax to Pay for Refugee Crisis, EURACTIV (Jan. 
19, 2016), http://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/eu-considers-petrol-tax-to-
pay-for-refugee-crisis [https://perma.cc/3EZQ-5P5A]. 
 99. Divert 10% of EU Budget to Refugee Crisis, Says German Minister, THEPRESSPROJECT 
(May 24, 2016, 3:18 PM), http://www.thepressproject.gr/article/95189/Divert-10-of-EU-Budget-
to-Refugee-Crisis-says-German-Minister [https://perma.cc/K2DY-7GL5]. 
 100. HENRIK ENDERLEIN & NICOLE KOENIG, TOWARDS DUBLIN IV: SHARING NORMS, 
RESPONSIBILITY AND COSTS 21 (Jacques Delors Institut – Berlin, Policy Paper No. 169, June 29, 
2016). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Jacopo Barigazzi, Matteo Renzi Proposes European ‘Migration Bonds,’ POLITICO (Apr. 
15, 2016, 10:23 PM), http://www.politico.eu/article/matteo-renzi-proposes-european-migration-
bonds-donald-tusk-jean-claude-juncker-border-controls/ [https://perma.cc/48RQ-P93Y]; see 
SUSANNE KRAATZ & MAGDALENA DIMOVA, LABOUR MARKET INTEGRATION OF REFUGEES; EU 
FUNDING INSTRUMENTS 8 (Eur. Parliament, Briefing No. PE 570.005, Feb. 2016). 
 103. George Soros, Europe: A Better Plan for Refugees, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Apr. 9, 2016, 10:00 
AM), www.nybooks.com/daily/2016/04/09/europe-how-pay-for-refugees/ [https://perma.cc/XDM 
7-93AC?type=image]. 
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At the Economic and Social Affairs Council meeting on January 15, 2016, 
German Finance Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, proposed to introduce a 
European petrol tax to secure expenditures to respond to the crisis and protect 
the external borders of the EU,104 with the possibility to supplement it with an 
additional carbon tax on fossil fuels.105 Such a measure would also address 
environment- and development-related goals,106 reflecting the inextricable 
interplay between environmental issues and refugee management within the 
larger scope of sustainable development. Schäuble’s proposal has legal standing 
on the basis of the TFEU, since Article 191 and Article 192 give the Union 
competence on the EU’s environmental objectives.107 Finland’s reaction 
exemplifies how fractured the EU political landscape is, with Finnish Finance 
Minister, Alexander Stubb, reacting positively, even if recognizing the proposal 
would be hard to implement, and Finnish Foreign Minister, Timo Soini, reacting 
negatively on the grounds that a new tax remains the sovereign competence of 
individual national states and not of the EU, with internal transfers of EU funds 
from other areas of the budget as the preferred way to intervene.108 
CONCLUSION 
The Lima Declaration on Tax Justice and Human Rights maintains that tax 
revenue is the most crucial tool to provide resources to support, protect, and 
uphold human rights in “sufficient, equitable and accountable ways.”109 EU law 
establishes ties between European and national tax policies110 that, in light of 
the principle of EU financial solidarity, result in inextricable links between 
human rights policies and fiscal policies. The European Union acknowledges 
solidarity as one of its primary drivers. This includes the sharing of all financial 
burden related to asylum. All the same, EU and national-level answers in respect 
 
 104. Zalan, supra note 97. 
 105. ALBERTO MAJOCCHI, GROWTH, JOBS AND MIGRATIONS: THE REAL CHALLENGES 8 
(Centre for Studies on Federalism, Policy Paper No. 18, June 2016). 
 106. Jan Corfee-Morlot & Stephanie Ockenden, Finding Synergies for Environment and 
Development Finance, in OECD, DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014: MOBILISING 
RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 207, 207 (2014). 
 107. Guntram B. Wolff, Opinion, European Financing for the European Refugee Crisis, 
BRUEGEL (May 11, 2016), http://bruegel.org/2016/05/european-financing-for-the-european-refu 
gee-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/L9CC-2NW7]. 
 108. Stubb Says EU Petrol Tax to Fund Migrant Crisis Worth Considering, Soini Says No Way, 
YLE UUTISET (Jan. 17, 2016, 7:50 PM) (Fin.), https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/stubb_says_eu_pe 
trol_tax_to_fund_migrant_crisis_worth_considering_soini_says_no_way/8602347 [https://perma. 
cc/KZ3X-TFYT]. 
 109. LIMA DECLARATION ON TAX JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHT ¶ 2 (2015). 
 110. See FLAVIA PIPERNO, MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE POLICIES OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: TRENDS TOWARD A COSMOPOLITAN APPROACH 8 (Centro Studi di Politica 
Internazionale, Policy Paper, Nov. 2014) (recognizing that policy related to human rights and the 
well-being of migrants is now a “transnational issue”). 
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to the use of tax measures to help solve or mitigate the migration and refugees 
crisis have been inadequate and uncoordinated, with a number of ad-hoc 
initiatives111 taking the place of the concerted, proactive fiscal campaign the 
circumstances would require. The consequential lack of financial resources to 
properly manage the phenomenon and the absence of a single European policy 
that naturally extends to tax policies places both the EU and its Member states 
at risk of violating those human rights that the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights has been instated to protect. This is extremely unsettling when 
considering that because of the EU Charter and its principles, additional primary 
EU legislation has been promulgated in the field of asylum and immigration.  
Article 80 of the TFEU requires more than “mere cooperation” between the 
EU and its Member states,112 introducing a specific legal obligation of financial 
solidarity in the field of asylum policies. The joint stipulations of the EU Charter 
and the TFEU suggest that fiscal measures that support the human rights of 
asylum seekers is not a matter of political debate113 any more, but rather a EU-
level duty to ensure that the European and national systems are able to meet 
human rights standards as they are protected not only under international law, 
but also under primary EU law.114 
Solidarity is a EU legal principle with substantive obligations, especially if 
we read it under the lens of the EU Charter on the right of asylum. The EU and 
its Member States cannot afford noncompliance, especially when a humanitarian 
crisis puts fundamental European values at great risk.115 Noncompliance with 
compulsory primary EU law could lead to a procedure before the ECJ for 
violation of EU law, in accordance with Article 263 of the TFEU,116 which 
stipulates that any natural or legal person may bring any act addressed to them 
or which is their direct and individual concern before the Court, if they are of 
the opinion that such an act violates their fundamental rights as protected and 
regulated by the EU.117 
 
 111. Grigonis, supra note 27, at 94. 
 112. ELENI KARAGEORGIOU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF SOLIDARITY IN THE COMMON 
EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM: ARTICLE 80 TFEU AND ITS ADDED VALUE 4 (SIEPS - Eur. Policy 
Analysis, No. 14, Nov. 2016). 
 113. Philippe De Bruycker & Evangelia (Lilian) Tsourdi, Building the Common European 
Asylum System Beyond Legislative Harmonisation: Practical Cooperation, Solidarity and External 
Dimension in REFORMING THE COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM: THE NEW EUROPEAN 
REFUGEE LAW 499 (Vincent Chetail et al. eds., 2016). 
 114. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Enhanced Intra-
EU Solidarity in the Field of Asylum: An EU Agenda for Better Responsibility-Sharing and More 
Mutual Trust, at 2, Brussels, COM (2011) 835 final (Dec. 2, 2011). 
 115. KARAGEORGIOU, supra note 112, at 11. 
 116. Id. at 6 & n.39. 
 117. Grigonis, supra note 27, at 96. 
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A major point in the querelle118 is the fact that the EU does not have general 
taxation powers. This is not expected to change in the near future.119 
Nevertheless, changes to the way taxation and public financial measures are 
handled at the community level are needed if the EU wants to successfully tackle 
phenomena such as the ongoing crisis, where issues of migration, refuge, human 
rights, and development are tightly intertwined.  
This Paper maintains that the legal basis for solidarity measures relying on 
taxation would be the principle of financial solidarity as laid out in Article 80 of 
the TFEU. While it can be argued that the language of the new provision in 
Article 80 is unclear,120 such lack of clarity can be dissipated by means of the 
provisions in Article 18 and Article 19 of the EU Charter. Read and discussed 
in context, these provisions create a much more meaningful framework that can 
be used to assess the boundaries of the financial obligation to protect human 
rights introduced by Article 80. 
Furthermore, the joint obligations of the EU Charter and of the TFEU on the 
right of asylum would suggest that it would be desirable to achieve unequivocal 
agreement between the EU and its Member States on what can be done through 
taxation to help respect and uphold the human rights of refugees and migrants. 
Additionally, more attention should be paid to the second part of Article 80 of 
the TFEU, as it gives the EU the power to adopt measures to make the principle 
of financial responsibility effective.121 There is a legal basis for solidarity 
measures through taxation in the new Article 80 as supported by Article 18 and 
Article 19 of the EU Charter. Further investigation is most certainly necessary, 
but such a solidarity tax would not only be in line with the ongoing reforms at 
the EU level, but would also positively acknowledge the international 
responsibility of individual EU Member states deriving from Article 2(1) of the 
ICESCR and the limits that the Refugee Convention, Article 29 and Article 34, 
poses on tax measures for refugees. 
  
 
 118. Definition: “A quarrel about petty points.” VOCABULARY.COM, https://www.vocabulary. 
com/dictionary/fr/querelle [https://perma.cc/5YKP-G5WA]. 
 119. KIRKEGAARD, supra note 40, at 7. 
 120. Elspeth Guild, Administrative Law and the Common European Asylum System, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EU ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 137, 144 (Carol Harlow et al. eds., 2017). 
 121. Article 80 maintains in its second part: “Whenever necessary, the Union acts adopted 
pursuant to this Chapter shall contain appropriate measures to give effect to this principle.” TFEU 
art. 80, supra note 20, at 78. 
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